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Abstract
We propose a minority route choice game to investigate the effect of the
network structure on traffic network performance under the assumption of
drivers’ bounded rationality. We investigate ring-and-hub topologies to cap-
ture the nature of traffic networks in cities, and employ a minority game-
based inductive learning process to model the characteristic behavior under
the route choice scenario. Through numerical experiments, we find that
topological changes in traffic networks induce a phase transition from an un-
congested phase to a congested phase. Understanding this phase transition
is helpful in planning new traffic networks.
Keywords: Agent-based simulation, Traffic networks, Route-choice
problems, Bounded rationality
1. Introduction
There are various types of traffic networks, e.g., road traffic networks,
railway networks, and aviation networks. These underlying infrastructures
support numerous social and economic activities. Hence, understanding the
complex behavior and performance of traffic systems based on such networks
has attracted considerable attention across a wide range of disciplines, in-
cluding traffic engineering [1, 2, 3], economics [4], physics [5], and computer
science [6].
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The main difficulty in analyzing traffic network performance lies in devi-
ations from the user equilibrium (UE), in which drivers in traffic networks
are assumed to be completely rational and have perfect information about
their route choice behavior. In real situations, the above two assumptions
of UE are invalid. It is known from the Selten’s study [4] that UE can not
be reached even in an idealized system, where drivers have the same origin
and destination pair and only two routes to choose from. Laboratory exper-
iments in their study demonstrate that the number of drivers on each route
fluctuates until the end of the experiment, even though the mean number of
drivers on each route becomes close to the equilibrium.
Agent-based models (ABMs) provide a good framework for dealing with
the bounded rationality of drivers on abstract networks. In ABMs, drivers
are represented by agents with limited intelligence. A number of studies have
considered such a framework. Nakayama et al. [1] built a driver model with
cognition and learning under the route-choice scenario, and they found that
the network flow does not necessarily converge to UE, but may reach the
deluded equilibrium, which can be derived from the drivers’ false perception
of the environment. Gourley et al. [7] used a Minority Game (MG) to for-
mulate the agents’ route choice behavior between a shortcut with variable
congestion costs and a detour with a constant cost.
One factor that has a nontrivial influence on the traffic network perfor-
mance is the variation in traffic network structures. In the real world, there
are numerous types of structured road networks, which makes it more difficult
for drivers to select an optimal route among the alternatives. Many studies
from this viewpoint have focused on the UE solution [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
These influential aspects of traffic network analysis, however, have not
been combined in a unified framework, and so these analyses have not been
comprehensive. Although previous studies on ABMs have incorporated the
simple aspects of the drivers bounded rationality, another important aspect
of bounded rationality, such as preference heterogeneity, has not yet been
considered, and variations in network structures have not been investigated.
In the previous researches on UE, the effects of network structures have been
examined comprehensively, but these studies have not dealt with the drivers’
bounded rationality.
In this paper, we aim to overcome the deficiencies in existing approaches
by building a new ABM. To deal with drivers bounded rationality and pref-
erence heterogeneity, we borrow the strategy of MG and Market directed
resource allocation game (MDRAG) [14]. To simulate variations in network
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structures, we employ Gourleys ring-and-hub topology [7]. In addition, we
explore the optimal network structure under these conditions for implication
to plan new traffic networks.
2. Model
2.1. Overview of the simulation model
The complexity of the route choice problem can be understood by the
following scenario similarly explained by Gourley [7]. When you are the only
traveler on a road traffic network, it is not difficult to determine the quickest
route to get to your destination. However, in most cases, a large number
of travelers must simultaneously choose a route along a common network to
reach their respective destinations. This condition makes the traffic situation
complicated. If too many travelers select the same shorter (or quicker) route,
the route tends to become extremely congested. In such cases, making a
detour may be a better choice. At the system level, if the travelers were
perfectly rational and had perfect information, it would be possible to attain
the UE state, wherein no driver could reduce the transportation cost by
switching to a different route. However, as drivers are boundedly rational in
reality, i.e., traffic information is incomplete and their capacity to evaluate
routes is limited, it is impossible for them to make perfect decisions. In
addition, each driver has a different preference for choosing his or her route,
and this heterogeneity leads to complicated situations. Therefore, UE can
rarely be attained in real situations.
To tackle this complexity and achieve the research objectives, we con-
struct a new agent-based model, based on the Gourley’s model [7], with the
extension of consideration of network topological changes. Additionally, we
introduce preference heterogeneity [14] to Gourley’s model in an attempt
to capture the route choice behavior more realistically. Thus, the proposed
model consists of two parts, a network model, and an agent’s decision-making
model.
2.2. Ring-and-hub network topology
To express the route choice scenario which I described above, we employ a
ring-and-hub network shown in Fig. 1. This network consists of N peripheral
nodes, which are mutually connected by their nearest neighbors, and a central
hub node, which is connected to only λ ≤ N peripheral nodes. Each node
is assigned exactly one agent, so there are N agents on the network. Each
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agent departs from her origin node and later arrives at her destination node,
which is randomly assigned at the begining of the simulation. There are two
possible routes by which each agent can reach their destination (indicated
by blue and red lines in Fig. 1). One is an outside route that does not pass
through the central hub, whereas the other is an inside route that passes
through the central hub. The outside route can be considered as a detour,
and the inside route is a shortcut.
O
D
Hin
Hout
Cnout
O
D
Hin
Hout
Cnin
Fig. 1: Ring-and-hub network. The outside route is depicted by the blue line, and the
inside route is depicted by the red line.
In this modeled traffic network, the transportation costs for the outside
and inside routes of agent n = 1, . . . , N at each time step t = 1, . . . , T
are represented by C
(n)
out (t) and C
(n)
in (t), respectively. C
(n)
out (t) is simply the
number of links along the shortest peripheral path connecting the origin and
the destination. C
(n)
in (t) depends on the number of agents in the central hub.
The cost function is given as follows:
C
(n)
out (t) = d(O,D), (1)
C
(n)
in (t) =
{
d(O,Hin) + α · d(Hin,Hout) + d(Hout,D) if Nin (t) ≤ L
d(O,Hin) + β · d(Hin,Hout) + d(Hout,D) if Nin (t) > L.
(2)
Here, α is a noncongestion coefficient and β is a congestion coefficient; L is
the central hub capacity, which represents the limited number of agents who
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can be handled by the hub without congestion, and Nin (t) is the number
of central hub users at time step t. d(·,·) is the length of the shortest path
on the peripheral path between nodes. O and D are the origin and desti-
nation nodes, respectively. Hin and Hout are the interchange nodes that the
agent can use to pass through the hub node along the inside route. In this
experiment, we set α and β to 1
2
and 3
2
, respectively. Thus, hub users may
reach their destination at a lower cost under noncongestion, or at a higher
cost under congestion. An example is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this example
case, C
(n)
out (t) will be 18; C
(n)
in (t) will be 11.5 if the hub node is not congested
and 24.5 if the hub node is congested. There may be several possible in-
side routes in this example, but the agents only consider the least-cost inside
route among the candidates.
To express various network structures parametrically, we vary the number
of links connected to the hub node, λ, while the symmetry of the network
remains unchanged, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Note that it is impractical to
consider all topological combinations of ring-and-hub networks. In addition,
considering that traffic networks are artificially designed, it is not unreason-
able to consider only symmetric cases.
λ= 2 λ= 3 λ= 4 λ=N
Fig. 2: Hub links are symmetrically added to the existing network one at a time
2.3. Minority route-choice game model
This route choice game on the ring-and-hub network can be interpreted
as a situation whereby a traveler considers whether to use a freeway to reach
the destination or not. The hub node corresponds to the freeway, and the
peripheral nodes correspond to some sites with or without an entrance of the
freeway. If the driver’s origin is far from the entrance to the freeway, using a
local road would be more efficient, as there would be a high cost associated
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with reaching a nearby interchange. If the driver’s origin is close to an
interchange, he/she would use the freeway in order to get to the destination
earlier. In this case, however, the driver must also consider the possibility of
traffic congestion on the freeway.
In this experiment, agents follow the Minority route choice game (MRCG),
which is an inductive reasoning rule to select the routes to reach their re-
spective destinations. This inductive reasoning rule has a common structure
with strategies in the MG case [15, 16], because route-choice problems are
very similar to the choice of minority [17, 7]. MRCG agents can choose from
S strategies. Each strategy s suggests an action s(µ) according to the past
hub states in the form of an M -bit history string µ. At each time step t,
the hub state h (t) is recorded as either 0 (uncongested) or 1 (congested).
Hence, the total number of possible history strings is P = 2M , and there are
2P possible strategies. A binary number representing an action is assigned
to each history string corresponding to an agent’s choice of the outside route
(0) or the inside route (1). The probability of assigning each action is de-
termined by an integer parameter K = 0, . . . , P [14], which represents the
tendency of the strategy to have an action 0, where action 0 is employed
with probability K
P
and action 1 is employed with probability P−K
P
. If K is
small, the strategy is likely to suggest action 0 persistently, and vice versa.
In a homogeneous version of MRCG, we set K = P
2
= 2M−1, where each
strategy has an equal likelihood of action 0 or 1 for each history string. In
the heterogeneous version of MRCG, we select an integer K uniformly from
0, . . . , P for each strategy. An example for M = 3, K = 4 is listed in Table. 1.
Among the S strategies, each agent n selects the strategy with the best
score. At each time step t, the score of each strategy Us (t) is updated based
on whether the strategy achieves a lower-cost route or not. If a strategy
results in a lower cost, its score is increased. If a strategy leads to a higher
cost, its score is decreased. Note that this update is performed regardless
of whether or not the strategy is executed at that time step. The update
equation is as follows:
Us (t+ 1) = Us (t) + sign
(
C
(n)
out (t)− C(n)in (t)
)
(2s (µ)− 1) (3)
where sign is the sign function.
The entire structure of the simulation model is illustrated in Fig. 3.
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History string Action
000 0
001 1
010 1
011 1
100 0
101 1
110 1
111 0
Table 1: An example of the homogeneous MRCG strategy for M = 3,K = 4. In the action
column, 1 denotes the inside route and 0 denotes the outside route. For instance, given
the history string 010, this strategy suggests action 1, denoting the inside route, whereas
the history string 111 leads to action 0.
2.4. Evaluation of the network performance
To assess the performance of the modeled traffic network, we employ the
following basic measures.
Average cost The average cost is calculated by averaging costs over all
agents and time steps:
〈C〉 = 1
TN
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
C(n) (t) , (4)
where C(n)(t) is the cost of agent n at time step t. Depending on the route
chosen by the agent, C(n)(t) can be either C
(n)
out(t) or C
(n)
in (t).
Congestion ratio The congestion ratio is the ratio of the congested state
to the uncongested state:
r =
1
T
∑
t=1
h (t) . (5)
Average number of hub users The average number of hub users is the
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Network	model Agent	model
updates	scores
selects	strategy
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updates	hub	state updates	
history
takes	action
calculates	
cost
updates	
history ・・・
Agent Agent
End	of	time	step
Start	of	time	step
updates	scores
selects	strategy
Fig. 3: Simulation model outline
average number of hub users over all time steps:
Nin =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Nin (t) . (6)
Standard deviation of Nin (t) The standard deviation of Nin (t) is cal-
culated over all time steps:
σNin =
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(Nin −Nin (t))2. (7)
Number of potential hub users Potential hub users are those agents
who incur lower costs by taking the inside route in the uncongested state
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than by taking the outside route; i.e., C
(n)
in (t|h (t) = 0) < C(n)out (t|h (t) = 0)
under noncongestion. The number of potential hub users is defined as:
Np =
N∑
n=1
H
(
C
(n)
out (t|h (t) = 0)− C(n)in (t|h (t) = 0)
)
(8)
where H (·) is the Heaviside step function:
H (x) =
{
0 if x ≤ 0
1 if x > 0.
(9)
Specifically, potential agents have incentive to use the central hub since they
can reduce the cost by using it.
3. Network structure vs network performance
3.1. Solution of Nash equilibrium
To assess the effects of agents’ bounded rationality, our simulation results
are compared with the Nash Equilibrium (NE) solutions, as NE is easier to
derive in this model than UE. Under NE, each agent selects the optimal
route, which implies that no agent can reduce the travel cost by switching
route. Therefore, if Np ≤ L, all potential agents would use the hub, and if
Np > L, the hub will contain exactly L potential agents. Note that the hub
will never be congested under NE. Multiple solutions for NE can be derived,
but for the comparison with the simulation results, we only derive the NE
solution with the best allocation (the lowest cost) and that with the worst
allocation (the highest cost).
When the hub node is uncongested, the difference between C
(n)
out (t|h (t) = 0)
and C
(n)
in (t|h (t) = 0) is:
l(n) = C
(n)
out (t|h (t) = 0)− C(n)in (t|h (t) = 0) . (10)
For all agents, the differences in cost form the array
(l(1), l(2), · · · , l(n), · · · , l(N)), (11)
which can be sorted in ascending order as follows:
(l(1
′), l(2
′), · · · , l(n′), · · · , l(N ′)). (12)
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In this array, entries 1′ to N ′p are potential agents, and entries N
′
p + 1 to
N ′ are non-potential agents. Therefore, the average cost for the NE with
the best allocation, 〈C〉NEb , and that for the NE with the worst allocation,
〈C〉NEw , are:
〈C〉NEb =
1
N
( ∑
n′≤min{Np,L}
C
(n′)
in (t|h (t) = 0) +
∑
min{Np,L}<n′
C
(n′)
out (t|h (t) = 0)
)
(13)
〈C〉NEw =
1
N
( ∑
n′≤Np−L
C
(n′)
out (t|h (t) = 0) +
∑
Np−L<n′≤Np
C
(n′)
in (t|h (t) = 0)
+
∑
Np<n′
C
(n′)
out (t|h (t) = 0)
) (14)
Note that the first term in Eq. (14) disappears when Np ≤ L.
3.2. Baseline results of MRCG
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
λ
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
〈 C〉
Homo-MRCG (S = 8, M = 2)
Homo-MRCG (S = 8, M = 4)
Homo-MRCG (S = 8, M = 8)
Random
Nash equil. (best)
Nash equil. (worst)
Fig. 4: Average cost for homogeneous agents
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λ
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
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0.5
0.6
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Homo-MRCG (S = 8, M = 2)
Homo-MRCG (S = 8, M = 4)
Homo-MRCG (S = 8, M = 8)
Fig. 5: Congestion ratio for homogeneous
agents
For the baseline case, we set the network scale to N = 100 and the hub
capacity to L = 80. The number of hub links was varied from 2 to N , and
the memory length was set to M = 2, 4, 8. We fixed S = 8 because M is
the dominant parameter in MG and it would be less meaningful to change S
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Fig. 6: Number of hub users for homogeneous
agents
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Fig. 7: Standard deviation of the number of
hub users for homogeneous agents
and M simultaneously. Here, K is fixed to 2M−1 to represent homogeneous
strategies. In each set of parameters, we computed the average results over
1000 simulations. Each simulation was carried out for 1000 time-steps, and
the first half of the simulation is for reaching the stable state, and the second
half of the simulation is for getting the statistical results. To evaluate the
adaptivity of MG agents, we conducted simulations with random agents, i.e.,
routes were chosen at random.
From Fig. 4, we can see that the simulation results behave similarly to
the NE solutions in the range 2 ≤ λ ≤ 9. In this range, agents can adapt
themselves to the environment, and the performance is much better than in
the case of random agents. For λ ≥ 10, however, the homogeneous MRCG
agents deviate from the NE solution. This deviation is caused by growth in
the congestion ratio at this point, as can be seen in Fig. 5. This congestion
can not be seen under the assumption of the Nash equilibrium. In the range
of λ ≤ 9, it is found that since the number of potential agents (purple dots
in Fig. 6), who can reduce their cost by using the central hub, is less than
the hub capacity, the network does not suffer from congestion. As more hub
links are added to the network, Np increases, and then Nin (t) increases as
well. This leads to the hub congestion. We can regard this change as a phase
transition from the uncongested phase to the congested phase.
It is important to investigate how different values of M influence the
network performances. In the congested phase, Fig. 4 indicates that, as the
memory length increases, the average cost decreases and becomes close to
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the worst case of Nash equilibrium. In addition, r decreases, enhancing the
network performance.
The network stability should also be investigated in terms of the standard
deviation of the number of hub users. From Fig. 7, we can see the minimum
of σNin at λ = 4 in the uncongested phase. After this critical point, the value
of σNin increases as more hub links are added to the network for M = 2
agents until λ = N . In contrast, for large memory agents, σNin reaches
the nearly stable state at λ = 15. In the uncongested phase, the stability
of homogeneous MRCG agents is better than that of random agents, and
those with shorter memory lengths lend better stability to the system. In
this region, it can be inferred that the agents are divided into two groups,
one comprising hub users and one comprising non-hub users, and σNin is
better than that of random agents thanks to this division. In the congested
phase, however, the stability becomes worse than in the random agents. The
increase in memory length positively affects stability, especially in the range
λ ≥ 70. Overall, in terms of stability, networks with fewer hub links perform
better than those with a large number of hub links.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
λ
N
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
r
Homo-MRCG (N = 20)
Homo-MRCG (N = 40)
Homo-MRCG (N = 60)
Homo-MRCG (N = 80)
Homo-MRCG (N = 100)
Fig. 8: Congestion ratio for different scale networks
We also conducted numerical experiments for different network scales,
with N = 20, 40, 60, 80, S = 8, M = 2, and L
N
= 0.8. For the different
networks, we can also observe a phase transition in Fig. 8. Thus, this phase
transition can be considered a fundamental property of agents with bounded
rationality.
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Hetero-MRCG (S = 8, M = 4)
Hetero-MRCG (S = 8, M = 8)
Random
Nash equil. (best)
Nash equil. (worst)
Fig. 9: Average cost for heterogeneous agents
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
λ
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
r
Hetero-MRCG (S = 8, M = 2)
Hetero-MRCG (S = 8, M = 4)
Hetero-MRCG (S = 8, M = 8)
Fig. 10: Congestion ratio for heterogeneous
agents
3.3. Effects of preference heterogeneity on the network performance
Next, we investigated the effect of preference heterogeneity on network
performance. To this effect, we introduced preference heterogeneity into the
agents strategies. The value of K, which determines the action distribution
of strategies, was set to K = P
2
= 2M−1 in the homogeneous case, but for
the heterogeneous version of MRCG, we set K by selecting integer values
uniformly from 0, . . . , P . The other parameter settings for the simulations
were the same as for homogeneous MRCG.
Similarly to the homogeneous MRCG case, we can observe a phase tran-
sition occurring at around λ = 9 in Fig. 9. In the uncongested phase, we can
see the identical behavior of 〈C〉 as discussed in 3.2, giving a good match with
the NE solution. In the congested phase, the average cost becomes higher
than in the homogeneous case. The cost is also higher than in the case of
random agents. This phenomenon is because r is high even for the large
memory capacity (see Fig. 10), unlike the cases of homogeneous MRCG. In
contrast to the cases of homogeneous MRCG, Nin approaches to the hub
capacity as the memory length increases seen in Fig. 11.
Regarding network stability, we can also see the minimum of σNin in the
uncongested phase. As M increases, the stability of the network is enhanced,
as shown in Fig. 12. In the congested phase, similar to the homogeneous
MRCG scenario, the increase in M acts to reduce the value of σNin. Unlike
the homogeneous MRCG, however, σNin for M = 8 agents is always below
that for random agents.
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Fig. 11: Number of hub users for heteroge-
neous agents
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Fig. 12: Standard deviation of the number of
hub users for heterogeneous agents
3.4. Implications of results for traffic network planning
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
L
N
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
C op
tim
al
Homo-MRCG
Hetero-MRCG
Fig. 13: Optimal number of hub links
In reality, there are numerous road networks that accommodate different
numbers of drivers without congestion, as they have different road capacities.
To construct well-designed networks, it is important to know the optimal
network structure according to the different hub-node capacities. For this
purpose, we conducted a numerical experiment by changing the hub capacity
ratio L
N
from 0.3 to 0.9. We omit the results for L
N
= 0.2 because the
simulation result for this case does not exhibit any phase transition. We set
N = 100, S = 8,M = 2 for this experiment.
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Fig. 13 shows the optimal value of λ, the number of hub links that min-
imizes 〈C〉, for different hub capacities. We can see that the optimal λ
increases nonlinearly as the hub capacity is augmented. However, the opti-
mal λ value remains small compared to the network scale (N = 100), even
for a large hub capacity, L
N
= 0.9. For example, when L
N
= 0.9, the optimal
value of λ is less than or equal to 15. This suggests that traffic networks with
ring-and-hub structures should have less than or equal to 15% hub links.
4. Conclusion
In this study, we built an ABM to investigate the effects of network
structures on network performance under the assumption that drivers were
operating under the bounded rationality. Through numerical experiments,
we found that networks undergo a critical phase transition from the uncon-
gested phase to the congested phase, corresponding to the particular number
of hub links. The network performance is maximized around this transition
point. While the system becomes similar to the NE case in the uncongested
phase, the performance of the network in the congested phase declines and
is worse than its corresponding NE performance. In addition, we examined
how agents’ preference heterogeneity affects network performance. We found
that agents’ preference heterogeneity enhances the system stability in terms
of hub usage for large memory agents, but increases the transportation cost.
Moreover, we conducted simulations to examine the performances under the
different hub node capacities. The simulation results demonstrate that the
optimal value of λ increases nonlinearly, but remains much smaller than the
whole network size N .
Overall, our results show the importance of considering the bounded ra-
tionality and preference heterogeneity of drivers in the modeling and research
of traffic network problems, and partially answer the question of how to build
a well-structured traffic network in reality. Concretely, our simulation results
imply that traffic networks with much access to a freeway may easily reach
a state of congestion. In contrast, limiting access to freeways could mitigate
traffic congestion and enable the Nash equilibrium to be reached.
The simulation model in this study, employing a ring-and-hub topology,
focuses on a specific situation, and only symmetric network topologies have
been considered. In future works, we would like to generalize this research
topic to obtain a universal perspective and apply the proposed analyses to
15
practical problems. In addition, a validation of the proposed model should
be conducted.
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